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General context of the electricity sector reform 
Nowadays Russian energetics experiences a crucial stage 
of its development: the property structure and mecha-
nisms of interaction between participants of this eco-
nomic sector are being formed. Proposed by RAO UES 
and approved by government resolutions, the program of 
industry reform suggests creation of independent ener-
getic companies and development of the competitive 
market. According to these documents the main reasons 
for the reform start are as follows.  
1. Prices formed on the cost method did not stimulate 
cost reduction and production efficiency increase. 
Under central planning system, it was profitable for 
agents to report false information on production 
costs. Contract relations on the wholesale market 
based on attachments of counteragents by the con-
tract payment center turned out to be inefficient.  
2. The industry needs huge capital investments for res-
toration and modernization of the production capaci-
ties and infrastructure. State investments are rather 
inefficient. Thus, it is necessary to privatize an es-
sential part of generating capacities and provide an 
investment attractiveness of the enterprises.  
The main argument for preservation of the state price 
regulation is an expectation of the significant price 
growth after transition to the deregulated market. Under 
conditions of Russian economy, such growth may lead to 
the mass bankruptcies in a number of industries where a 
large part of population is occupied. Therefore a question 
of the price level after the reform turns out to be very 
important for the choice of its concrete variant. 
First-price auction  
and possible electricity price growth  
One of the basic elements of the deregulated electricity 
market is a day before auction for wholesale electricity 
prices determination. Now it is organizes as a “first-
price auction” where the ultimate price equalizes the 
total supply and the total demand computed from par-
ticipants’ bids. Price forecasts by RAO UES (as well as 
by several theoretical papers) consider the competitive 
equilibrium price as the expected outcome of such auc-
tion. One of our main conclusions is that this kind of an 
auction provides a possibility for large generating com-
panies to execute their market power. The market price 
in such auction may substantially exceed the competi-
tive equilibrium price due to imperfect competition. 
Under rational behavior of generating companies aim-
ing to maximize their profits, the excess is proportional 
to the share of the largest company in the market and 
inversely proportional to the demand elasticity. A low 
demand elasticity and rather high concentration are 
typical for electricity markets. Our estimate shows that 
under the current project of the market design the 
price may 4-5 times exceed the competitive price. 
Computation of the expected price for the data on the 
Central Economic Region of Russia in 2000 confirms 
this estimate. Note that in that year the wholesale 
price exceeded the competitive price less than two 
times.  
Nowadays we do not observe any fast growth of the price 
because the share of the deregulated market and the 
price there is limited by the price in the regulated market 
(FOREM). Moreover, the theoretical studies show that 
behavior of generating companies in the completely de-
regulated market may essentially differ at the stage of 
the market development and at the further stage when a 
stable structure of its participants is formed. The eco-
nomic theory shows that at the first stage, under condi-
tions of the sharp intrasector competition, the optimal 
strategy for a firm’s growth and survival is competitive 
behavior. It means increasing of the production volume 
until the marginal cost is equal to the market price. 
Meanwhile, for the second stage the optimal strategy is a 
maximization of the profit. Therefore and also because of 
political reasons we may expect that a significant growth 
of the price related to transition from the competitive 
equilibrium to the oligopolistic (by Cournot) equilibrium 
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of the first-price auction will take place after formation of 
the basic staff of the market participants.  
There exist two possibilities to prevent the price growth: 
1) to hold the government regulation; 2) to employ an 
alternative market mechanism. Shortcomings of the first 
way are well known: it creates a possibility for abuse of 
administrative power, corruption and reduction of the 
market efficiency. So in our research we focus on analy-
sis of different variants of the day before auction organi-
zation. 
Vickrey auction and policy proposals 
A reasonable alternative to the standard auction is Vick-
rey auction with reserve prices. In such auction the pay-
ment to each company proceeds from reserve prices that 
are calculated on the base of the demand function and 
the bids of other firms. Our report describes a mecha-
nism of this auction and a method for its outcome calcu-
lation for a local market and a simple network market 
with two nodes. The advantage of this auction is maximi-
zation of the total welfare of participants (producers and 
consumers) under individually rational behavior (corre-
sponding to the Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies). 
Our computations for the data on the market in the Cen-
tral economic region of Russia show that under typical 
values of electricity demand elasticity, the expected price 
for consumers in such auction would be essentially (2-3 
times) lower than the price in the standard first-price 
auction. An additional decrease of the price for consum-
ers may be obtained if computation of the reserve prices 
takes into account information on marginal costs and 
maximal capacities of generators. Our report provides the 
corresponding method. 
Proceeding from the mentioned results, we conclude that 
RAO UES and state departments concerned with energet-
ics should organize the work on technical, organizational 
and legislative issues of Vickrey auction implementation 
as an alternative to the standard first-price auction. 
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